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Introduction
Resistance to antibiotics is hardly a new problem; ever since the advent of
penicillin and other antibiotics more than 50 years ago deant strains of bacteria
have emerged.1 The harrowing aspect is that now almost every human pathogen
treated with antibiotics is showing resistance, and many doctors fear that this
will only be the tip of the iceberg.2 After all, every time any antibiotic is used,
while it may kill the majority of the bacteria the drug was intended to destroy,
there is a likelihood that a few germs will remain, surviving because of their
resistant traits or their ability to mutate and become resistant to antibiotics.
Once created, these resistant genes can multiply quickly, creating new strains
of bacteria that could result in the patient's next infection failing to respond to
the previously administered antibiotic.3 In fact, bacteria can reproduce about
every twenty minutes, meaning resistance is quickly spread, and the resistant
strand eventually becomes the dominant strand of that species.4
Many of these concerns result from the widespread overuse and overprescrip-
tion of antibiotics.5 Many patients and physicians are unaware of the possible
1See Tamar Nordenberg, Miracle Drugs v. Superbugs, FDA Consumer, Nov. 1998, at 22.
2Id. Linda Tollefson, director of surveillance and compliance in FDA's Center for Vet-
erinary Medicine, said, \You're dealing with living microbes that have shown an incredible
ability to accommodate antibiotics and come out winning. We have no idea what they are
going to do next. Our fear is that we're seeing the tip of the iceberg."
3See id.
4See Scott B. Markow, Penetrating the Walls of Drug-Resistant Bacteria: A Statutory
Prescription to Combat Antibiotic Misuse, 87 Geo. L.J. 531 (1998).
5See Michael Misocky, The Epidemic of Antibiotic Resistance: A Legal Remedy to Eradi-
cate the \Bugs" in the Treatment of Infectious Diseases, 30 Akron L. Rev.733, 734 (1997).
1harm caused by overuse of antibiotics, and even when the doctor is aware of
the risk antibiotics are often prescribed to placate the patient who views an-
tibiotics as a panacea.6 Out of the 150 million prescriptions for antibiotics each
year, one expert comments that 50% of these are considered inappropriate pre-
scriptions.7 Such misuse of antibiotics has already resulted in new strains of
previously believed easily controlled diseases, such as tuberculosis, dysentery,
and malaria.8 Sadly, this is far from just a United States problem, since in
many parts of the world, such as Mexico, South America, and Southeast Asia,
antibiotics are available over-the-counter.9 It is this constant overuse through
the years of antibiotics that have some expressing concern of a plausible \super-
bug"; a micro-organism eectively resistant to all known forms of antibiotics.10
If one views a \superbug" as a far-fetched notion, just consider some examples.
In 1941 virtually every case of the contagious killer Staphylococcus aureus was
curable with penicillin, while today fewer than 5% of these cases are treatable
with penicillin.11 Further consider that today there are three life-threatening
bacteria strains (Enterococcus faecalis, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, and Psue-
domonas aeruginosa) which are resistant to all current antibiotics.12 Scientists
still do not entirely understand the possibilities of bacterial reproduction, mu-
tation, and transference of certain traits, making it impossible to rule out or
6See id., at 736.
7See Ron Gasbarro, Combating Growing Bacterial Antibiotic Resistance, American Drug-
gist, Feb. 1996, at 49.
8See id.
9See Stuart B. Levy, The Antibiotic Paradox: How Miracle Drugs Are Destroying
the Miracle 6 (1992).
10See Misocky, supra note 5, at 735.
11See Markow, supra note 4, at 531.
12See id.
2properly calculate the potential for a \superbug".
Modern technology and medical practice presents even more challenging prob-
lems in the area of antibiotic resistance, in particular in the areas of genetic
engineering and the proliferation animal drug use. In the areas of genetically
engineered foods and animal drugs a threat is feared because of the capability of
the spread of resistance in a stealthy manner that could compromise the safety
of the population without scientists having any indicators or notice. Quite sim-
ply, these areas are a looming threat because they are largely unregulated and
not entirely understood. While scientists can ably predict that antibiotic use in
human will lead to resistance, the consumption of genetically engineered foods
or meat tainted with antibiotic resistant bacteria is much harder to monitor and
unpredictable as to how it will aect and spread through humans.
Fortunately, the FDA is in a unique position to play a role in the safe devel-
opment of the aforementioned areas. While it is not a plausible option for the
FDA to simply approve new antibiotics to combat resistance because the rate
of development is not sucient to keep up with the rate of newly-created resis-
tant strains,13 there are alternative methods for the FDA in ghting the battle
against antibiotic resistance. This paper will analyze the problems the FDA
confronts within the elds of genetic engineering and animal drugs as it relates
to antibiotic resistance. Finally, this paper will also suggest general strategies
the FDA can pursue to address the potential epidemic of widespread antibiotic
13See Denise Grady, A Move to Limit Antibiotic Use in Animal Feed: Fewer Hardy Bacteria
in People is U.S. Goal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1999, at A1.
3resistance.
4Part I. Genetically Engineered Food.
A. An Overview
The ability to genetically engineer crops, livestock, and microorganisms
holds out hope for better food production, distribution, and as a possible so-
lution to worldwide nutrition problems. In the past few years the new genetic
modication capabilities have gone from the lab to the marketplace, sparking
concerns over the implications. Indeed, nearly 80 million acres of transgenic
crops were planted worldwide last year, including 50% of the soybean acreage
in the United States.14Armed with the technological capability for genetic en-
gineering, many fear scientists do not have the insight to foretell or predict the
consequences of gene modication in living organisms.15 Indeed, this is essen-
tially an insurmountable problem. No matter how much knowledge and detail
about a parent organism is known, any new life form is so complex that its
potential harms and risks can not be ascertained, despite detailed knowledge
about the organisms' anatomy or lineage.16
For example, in genetically engineered herbicide resistant plants scientists an-
ticipated little environmental risk since the plants were unlikely to develop the
invasive properties of weeds.17 However, within three years scientists found
the herbicide resistant traits had transferred to nearby weeds through ordinary
14James P. Lucier, Freezing Out the Farmers, Insight on the News, Nov. 15, 1999, at 10.
15Transgenic Agriculture: Biosafety and International Trade, 4 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L.
4 para. 18 (1998) (comments of Michael Baram).
16Note, Regulating Genetically Engineered Microorganisms Under the Toxic Substances
Control Act, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 223, 227-28 (1995).
17See Transgenic, supra note 15, at n. 57.
5cross-pollination.18 This simple example helps illustrate the delicate and un-
predictable character of nature. Living organisms act in seemingly random and
yet interdependent ways, and even when scientists know the exact traits of an
organism or plant, they are often unable to predict the consequences of those
traits on the plant itself or the surrounding area when the new species is intro-
duced into the environment. It is even more harrowing when one considers that
for many genetically engineered plants and foods the traits that might pose a
danger to nature or mankind will not even be apparent to scientists.
While the above example demonstrates the general concern over the complexity
involved when manipulating naturally occurring organisms, the more specic
and central concerns over genetically engineered items are divided into three
categories: economic risks, environmental risks, and human health and safety
concerns.
First, economic issues arise because small farmers can be driven out of the mar-
ket since genetically engineered foods will be designed to be cheaper and easier
to produce on an economy of scale.19 Smaller farmers and those who fail to
use genetically altered crops will also be threatened because the most common
pesticides, such as bacillus thuringiensis (\Bt"), will be genetically built into
plants, altering the environment with this sustained use of Bt so that alterna-
tive methods of farming will become obsolete due to the immunity pests will
develop to many pesticides unless present at the abnormally high rates that
18See id.
19Kirsten S. Beaudoin, On Tonight's Menu: Toasted Cornbread with Firey Genes? Adapt-
ing Food Labeling Law to Consumer Protection Needs in the Biotech Century, 83 Marq. L.
Rev. 237, 243 (1999).
6will be found in genetically engineered crops.20 Such a use of pesticides has
been analogized to indiscriminate use of antibiotics since the pesticides are used
without regard to need or infestation, while also threatening other life, such
as the monarch buttery in the example of Bt.21 The farming market will be
under the control of the biotech companies, leaving farmers to either accept the
terms of biotech companies or risk losing their business as those farmers using
genetically altered crops drive everyone else out of the market. One company,
Monsanto, has even gone so far as to splice a soybean seed with \Terminator
Technology" so that the seed becomes sterile after a period of time, ensuring
that the farmers must order seeds every year from the company.22 While one
could argue a market system is better, when the threat is the monopolization
of our food supply by a few companies, regulation is needed, less we risk the
health and wallets of the public.
Environmental risks, the second category, relate to the discussion earlier in this
section. Because living organisms always change, adapt, and replicate, it is an
impossibility to determine the future consequences of genetic modication.23
Introducing engineered plants and organisms into the food chain is inevitably
unpredictable, regardless of how much scientic data is accumulated. One of
the main environmental risks cited is that genetically engineered plants pose a
signicant threat to biodiversity once introduced into the food chain.24
20See id., at 244.
21Jeannette Batz, Why Missouri Botanical Garden's Peter Raven, World-Renowned En-
vironmentalist, Courts Monsanto's Favor, Boosts Its Biotech and Takes Its Money, River-
front Times, Nov. 3, 1999.
22See Beaudoin, supra note 19, at 244.
23See id., at 245.
24See id.
7The third category, human health and safety, is obviously the most compelling.
The type of problems here cover the spectrum. For example, on one end there is
the possibility of the creation of irritants within everyday food. This occurred
in the mid-1980s when a new strain of celery was produced that was highly
resistant to insects.25 Unfortunately, it was later discovered that when people
handled the celery sticks they were developing severe skin rashes caused by the
shedding of psoralens, natural chemicals which become irritants when exposed
to sunlight.26 On the other extreme rests the possibly fatal or severely damaging
health eects. For an example of the extreme rhetoric and heated controversy
these types of concerns can wreak, look at the debate over Posilac, or what is
commonly called recombinant bovine somatotrophin (rBST) or bovine growth
hormone (BGH).27 The debate over BGH demonstrates science's inability to
accurately evaluate genetically altered products and the potential for consumer
hostility on an international scale. For example, because of the controversial
claims that BGH has carcinogenic qualities, Canada has banned BGH, while
the United States approves of the use of BGH to increase milk production in
dairy cows.28
Despite all of these problems associated with genetically engineered foods,
perhaps the most feared threat is the possibility of antibiotic resistance. The
next section will deal specically with the threat of antibiotic resistance in
humans as it relates to genetically engineered foods and plants.
25Phil Cohen, Living in a GM World, New Scientist, Oct. 31, 1998, at 42.
26See id.
27See Beaudoin, supra note 19, at 246.
28See id., at 248.
8B. Antibiotic Resistance and Genetically Engineered Foods
Antibiotic resistance is a risk that occurs because of the inability to predict
the results of genetic modication. If plants or foods contain bacterial genes
that cause antibiotic resistance it could quickly enter the human population if
those crops are consumed by humans, are feed for animals that are consumed
by humans, or simply aect the ecological chain and corrupt plants or foods
that t into the above categories.
The reasons why scientists fear genetically engineered plants pose a threat
deserves explanation. When plants are genetically modied by mixing proteins
across species lines, some of the transferred proteins will come from bacterial
genes, meaning that antibiotic resistance is a distinct possibility if the crop
enters the human food chain.29 Considering that genetic engineering will fo-
cus on those plants t for human consumption, a very real risk is apparent. An
additional risk resides, of course, in the increased use of antibiotics to ght infec-
tion because of engineered foods, which would be correlative with an increased
use of antibiotics by people hoping to prevent possible infection as genetically
engineered foods saturate the market.
However, the main risk of antibiotic resistance exists largely because of the
process by which scientists handle DNA in the creation of genetically engineered
plants. When identifying DNA in bacteria and plants, scientists use antibiotic
29See Transgenic, supra note 15., at para. 23.
9resistant genes as \markers". There is a threat that these markers, even though
genetically scrambled, could resurrect themselves and boost the spread of an-
tibiotic resistance in humans.30 These markers, used in genetically engineered
foods to show genetic transformation, are believed by many commentators to
pose a signicant risk of spreading from plants to man.31
The FDA's framework for approving and monitoring genetically engineered
foods is loose and susceptible to aws. The next section will discuss recommen-
dations for helping to improve the safety of the public that will be consuming
genetically engineered foods in increasing quantities over the next few years.
C. Recommendations for the FDA Concerning Genetically Engi-
neered Foods
One of the rst things that needs to be realized is the complete lack of a
structural process for the approval of genetically modied foods by the FDA.
Much like the GRAS exemptions for food additives, it is up to the discretion of
the producer of the genetically engineered food to determine if further testing
is required.32 As the FDA has said since taking a stance in 1992, \[The] FDA
has not found it necessary to conduct comprehensive scientic reviews of foods
derived from bioengineered plants."33 Like letting the fox guard the hen house,
letting biotech rms determine if lengthy testing and delays for entrance into
the marketplace is required is setting up a system where the perverse incentives
30See Cohen, supra note 25, at 42.
31Health Risks of Genetically Modied Foods, The Lancet, May 29, 1999, at 1811.
32Seeds of Change, Consumer Reports, September , 1999, at 41.
33See Health Risks, supra note 31, at 1811.
10will ultimately lead to poor decision-making. Indeed, companies only need to
bring summaries of their studies to the FDA to gain access to the market, never
allowing the FDA to see any real data.34 Unlike GRAS exemptions for food
additives, the regulatory scheme here makes little sense because there is no long
term use or understanding of genetically engineered foods that can ensure the
safety of the public. Recombinant DNA is a far cry from butter or salt, yet the
FDA insists on applying the same regime to both cases.
Fully aware of the eciency concerns at stake in testing of genetically en-
gineered foods for pre-market approval, perhaps the best system is one where
microcosm testing is performed. Microcosm testing simulates the environment
the food or plant will be introduced to and provides a small-scale model for how
the genetically engineered organism will react in nature.35 Scientists can repli-
cate nature by using plants, soil, and other organisms that will be present at
the planned release site and simulate the climate and moisture present at that
site.36 Scientists can then gauge the likely result of putting the crop into nature,
including measuring likely changes on the environment and on the plant itself.
However, the FDA must ensure the process for testing and approving such crops
is systematized, or else there is a risk of manipulation of the scientic processes.
Considering the potentially devastating economic and safety issues that geneti-
cally engineered crops present, this process would provide at least a basic safe-
guard against the possible consequences of modied crops. After all, it is the
34See id.
35See Transgenic, supra note 15., at para. 43.
36See id., at para. 44
11fear of the unknown changes that occur in nature that most spur the fears about
genetically engineered foods causing an increase in human antibiotic resistance.
If the interrelations of the environment are better understood, the possibility
of antibiotic resistant traits in plants and the likelihood of crossover to humans
can be calculated.
This process will incur expense, but it is an expense that should be directed
at the biotech companies. These companies will have to engage in the required
testing and present their full data to the FDA, but it is a system they will
be willing to endure considering the potentially huge prots they would reap
by increasing the quality and production of their products with genetically en-
gineered products. Viewing the volatile environment surrounding the debate
about the danger of genetically modied crops, such a systematic process for
approval might also provide long-term stability for companies once they under-
stand their products will be approved if they follow FDA guidelines. This, in
turn, will encourage companies to pursue the necessary research. As it is now,
biotech companies realize the uncertain environment and have every incentive
to push through their products without adequate testing since they understand
that the standard for approval could change at any time. Particularly in an area
like antibiotic resistance a simple chemical analysis for toxicity will not suce.
The status quo, therefore, is hardly likely to adequately protect the public.
Review of the data will necessarily mean more resources spent by the FDA, but
considering the high-prole nature of genetic engineering issues, it is likely that
more resources can be granted to FDA by Congress. The public is extremely
12concerned about genetic engineering, and such a touchy issue is likely to be seen
by Congress as justifying further FDA expenditures of time, money, and people.
Less resources will be required in this area as time goes on since certain genet-
ically engineered products, much like in the area of food additives, will become
accepted as safe, and biotech companies will no longer have to go through the
same procedures, instead relying on a GRAS-like exemption.
A second solution for the FDA is to label genetically engineered products. This
is keeping directly in line with the purpose of the FDA to protect and inform
the public so individuals can have a legitimate consumer choice. This is partic-
ularly appealing here, where all sides are divided as to the actual danger posed
by genetically altered products.
The specics of the scheme could be ironed out, but one suggestion which could
avoid any Constitutional speech problems would be a voluntary labeling idea for
companies to market foods that were not genetically engineered.37 This \posi-
tive" scheme avoids the problem of forcing producers to engage in what might
be labeled as speech when the government mandated labeling of genetically en-
gineered products. Of course, the biotech companies will complain that this
scheme will imply an inferiority of their products since the non-genetically engi-
neered label will serve essentially as a stamp of approval, but at least the choice
will be in the consumer's hands, and not a choice unlike decisions now based
on nutrition labeling. It still is important to note that a scheme forcing biotech
companies to label their products would probably be held constitutional since
37See Beaudoin, supra note 19, at 253.
13providing consumers with health information encompasses such a compelling
interest on behalf of the government.
Labeling is an appealing solution because of the current information available
to the public, mainly meaning little or none. In a survey done by the In-
ternational Food Information Council 71% of American viewed themselves as
poorly informed about genetically engineered foods.38 In an area where there
is legitimate debate that is often layered with misinformation because of vested
interests, perhaps public awareness is the needed catalyst for the proper research
on the dangers of genetically modied foods to take place. In addition, if the
research is inconclusive at least the government will have an accurate represen-
tation of how the public weighs the benets versus the risks by which products
are purchased. Perhaps in appraising the issue, the public opinion should weigh
heavily in the government's nal approach to the problem. After all, it is not as
if the government has been able to come to a consensus on the issue. In other
words, a labeling scheme might be the best way to approach risk-assessment.
Along the same lines, public opinion about the FDA might be bolstered if label-
ing for genetically engineered products was included. A labeling scheme would
show the FDA is trying to play an active role in guarding the public in the
fast-paced world of modern food technology. The public already shows a desire
to know the process by which a product was made; just look at the booming or-
ganic food industry as evidence that people are avoiding the uncertain modern
industrial processes. It would be hard to deny that people are at least pay-
38See Seeds, supra note 32, at 41.
14ing more attention to the methods that produce their foods. For example, one
recent poll by Time magazine showed the public supported the labeling of genet-
ically engineered foods by an overwhelming 81 %.39 At the very least, labeling
will ensure the public is aware of the amount of genetically engineered products
they consume, and because of this awareness there will be an avoidance of diets
overly concentrated with these foods. This overconcentration is important since
it could take large quantities of a specic altered food to increase the risk of
antibiotic resistance to a statistically signicant level. If there is a decrease in
use, or at least the avoidance of a diet dominated by one particular genetically
altered food, there is a decreased chance that antibiotic resistance will occur.
A labeling scheme also prevents the essential blackmailing of the FDA by biotech
companies with threatened lawsuits. As one scholar said, \the lack of federal
guidance permits a mounting litigious battle."40 Genetically altered food prod-
uct manufacturers have taken a litigious strategy already to manipulate the
FDA into discarding the labeling idea.41 By going ahead and implementing the
labeling structure, this threat by the biotech industry is ameliorated, and any
short-term lawsuit wave will be outweighed by the long-term lack of lawsuits
and threats to try and preserve the status quo.
Labeling might also be a good economic idea when one considers the interna-
tional view of genetically engineered foods. Internationally biotech companies
are viewed with far more skepticism, and much of it is driven by a grassroots
39See id.
40See Beaudoin, supra note 19, at 239.
41See id., at 249.
15movement against genetic engineering.42 The movement has achieved a large
amount of success, and recently the European Union announced a moratorium
on new approvals of genetically engineered foods until better EU safety reg-
ulations are put into place in 2002.43 If the US was to institute labeling for
genetically modied food products this might facilitate more trade with the in-
ternational community. Under the labeling system countries could know which
foods were genetically altered and the label might serve to generate a feeling
of security around genetically engineered products. Forthright labeling implies
honesty and safety, and this security would make foreign powers more willing to
deal with the US food market. Feeling of subterfuge and mistrust, even subtly
implied, could be disastrous in international trade negotiations.
Instituting further regulations is necessary to prevent the potentially disastrous
harm of widespread antibiotic resistance through genetically engineered foods.
Both microcosm testing and labeling would, for the reasons discussed, imple-
ment safeguards against potential harm by generating additional awareness
about the potential consequences of genetically engineered foods and, hopefully
in turn, produce increased knowledge.
42Ronnie Cummins and Ben Lilliston, The Rise and Fall of \Franken-Food", Earth Island
Journal, Dec. 22, 1999, at 30.
43See id.
16Part II. Animal Drugs and Antibiotic Resistance.
A.
An Overview
Drugs, specically antibiotics, are administered to animals routinely to treat
sickness, prevent illness, and promote the growth of animals.44 Indeed, 40% of
all antibiotics used in the U.S. are fed to animals being raised for their food
potential.45 The only use that many feel should be permitted is the therapeutic
use of helping sick animals. It is the sub-therapeutic uses, i.e. when the animals
are not sick, that causes scientists to be concerned. The most common way to
administer the antibiotics is through animal feed.
The use of antibiotics is essential in modern farming. Without sub-therapeutic
doses of antibiotics modern factory farming, which concentrates large number
of animals in a small amount of space, would not be possible.46 Animals can
only survive the disease and health problems that naturally accompany close
connement if they receive antibiotics.47 In addition, subtherapeutic doses of
antibiotics promotes growth, which means larger animals, more eggs from chick-
ens, and more milk from cattle.48 In addition, antibiotics are often sprayed in
subtherapeutic doses on fruit to prevent disease.49 A subtherapeutic dose is
44Linda Weinberg, How Overuse of Antibiotics on Farms Threatens Your Health: What to
Do, Environmental Nutriition, Nov. 1, 1999, at 1.
45See id.
46Barbara O'Brien, Animal Welfare Reform and the Magic Bullet: The Use and Abuse of
Subtherapeutic Doses of Antibiotics in Livestock, 67 U.Col.L.Rev. 407, 413 (1996).
47See id., at 412.
48See id., at n.24.
49See Weinberg, supra note 44, at 1.
17typically one to ten percent of a therapeutic dose to treat a sick animal.50 In
other words, the agricultural industry is wholly dependent on the widespread
use of antibiotics to produce at its current rate. In turn, the industry keeps the
grocery shelves full while keeping consumer cost down. However, there is con-
troversy surrounding the industry's current practice, and the concern extends
far beyond just the outrage over the conditions that many animals live with
modern farming.
B.
Antibiotic Resistance and Animal Drugs
The debate over animal drugs and antibiotic
Resistance in humans is nothing new. Indeed, since the early 1970s the FDA
has focused on the issue every 5-10 years, though never coming to a consensus
as to what approach to take.51 The basic fear is that antimicrobials in livestock
will trigger a resistant bacteria that could infect humans, whether through di-
rect exposure or by eating meat with the resistant bacteria.
As an example of the FDA's concern over animal drugs is the newly proposed
framework for evaluating new animal drugs in food-producing animals.52 Es-
sentially, the new framework would classify new and existing antibiotics based
upon their importance to human medicine, set thresholds based upon accept-
able levels of susceptibility of pathogens to antibiotics, and then monitor this
50See id.
51See Karen McMahon, Putting Animals at Risk, Farm Industry News, Apr. 1999, at 1.
52See generally Wes Ishmael, Hazard v. Risk, Access Control & Security Systems
Integration, May 1999.
18susceptibility to ensure safety in the future.53 Many have criticized these regu-
lations as too restrictive since most antibiotics used in veterinary medicine are
common to those used in human medicine, though there are rare exceptions
such as ionophores.54
Despite this new regulation, there is still considerable debate over whether an-
tibiotics used with animals are a threat to humans. For example, there is no
directly documented case where antibiotic use in animals has caused treatment
failure in humans.55 However, studies are showing a link. For example, a
group of Minnesota health specialists reported in the New England Journal of
Medicine that the approval and use of a drug in chickens was followed by an
eightfold increase in drug-resistant food poisoning involving the same drug.56
The particularly disconcerting fact is that the drug in question was quinolone,
a drug of rst resort for doctors.57
With the evidence on both sides still contested, there is debate on exactly how
antibiotic resistance would spill over into the human population. For example,
there is the potential for antibiotic resistant food poisoning from eating meat
with resistant bacteria, leading to dangerous cases of listeria, E. coli, salmonella,
and campylobacter.58 It is eating these foods with resistant bacteria that poses
the real threat, not from eating food laced with traces of antibiotics. Addi-
tionally, farmers and workers in slaughterhouses can become exposed to the
53See id.
54See id.
55See id.
56See Dick Thompson, Drugged Chicks Hatch a Menace, Time, May 31, 1999, at 81.
57See id.
58See Audra Hingley, Camylobacter: Low-Prole Bug is Food Poisoning, FDA Consumer,
Sept. 1, 1999, at 14.
19dangerous resistant bacteria just through contact with the animals.59 Without
proper cleaning, ingestion of bacteria can inadvertently occur. Crops also retain
the bacteria in question if they are fertilized with the manure of animals given
antibiotics.60
The stakes are high, but the evidence is confusing and sometimes conicting.
However, considering the risk involved with antibiotic resistance there should
be appropriate precautions taken by the FDA.
C.
Recommendations for the FDA Concerning Animal Drugs
The FDA, as could be expected with its limited
resources, is only able to focus so many hours on animal
drugs. Since the link between animal drugs and human
illness is so tenuous, the FDA perhaps wisely has avoided
allocating too many resources into this area. However, con-
sidering the recent evidence on the subject and the devas-
tating possible risk (even if proven statistically small), the
FDA should institute better safeguards in the area of ani-
mal drugs.
The rst step the FDA needs to take is a better monitoring procedure for
the distribution of animal drugs.61 While it might not be realistic to expect a
company like Monsanto to report possible aws in their products, the threat
of possible criminal charges might have the necessary inducement. This could
59See O'Brien, supra note 46, at 426.
60See id.
61See cf. David Aboulaa, Pushing RBST: How the Law and the Political Process Were
Used to Sell Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin to America, 15 Pace Envtl. L. rev. 604,
644 (1998).
20be done through manufacturers, veterinarians, and feed producers. If a central
form can be produced and sent in by the above groups, and the processing done
perhaps jointly with the USDA and EPA, the FDA would understand the usage,
amount of doses, and could also monitor adverse reactions within animals. Such
a system might also allow better checking of possible human resistance through
animal drugs, or at least an earlier indication of possible spill over into the
human population. Plus, if there is a system of monitoring in place it should
make the distributors and users of antibiotics more aware and cautious in the
amount they use and the drugs they put into the market. Just by having the
system in place it should serve to edify people that the FDA considers antibiotic
resistance a real health threat to the nation.
Additional testing of animal drugs is perhaps also needed. Expense is a
concern here, but the addition of user fees for animal drugs could perhaps oset
the cost. That seems like a small price to pay considering the risk at stake.
Political feasibility would be an issue, but the hot issue of antibiotic resistance
could help oset the political vulnerability of the user fee idea. The same idea
discussed with genetically engineered food, microcosm testing, could apply here.
Perhaps new animal drugs, specically antibiotics, could be tested on the main
food-producing animals. The animals could be tested for resistance, and any
products derived from those animals could be tested for a build-up of resistant
bacteria. Giving the food products to test animals might also help to demon-
strate the possible eects of consumption of the products. Clearly, this would
not be a perfect system since the duration and quantity of use could not be sim-
21ulated. However, truly dangerous products might exhibit resistance in a short
amount of time. Perhaps even more importantly, companies will realize these
tests will be performed and therefore will be more cautious in the design of new
animal drugs.
The cost of the testing will be shouldered by the companies. The cost will be
miniscule in comparison to the potential prot, but this regulation might be
viewed more favorably for other reasons. For one, it is an assurance that the
animal drugs will not be banned or severely restricted. Second, it will enhance
the industry's image within the public eye. Finally, the regulations can help
foster a cooperative spirit between industry and the FDA since the ndings of
the FDA will be based upon the research of the companies, and will not just be
a regulatory hand swooping down for unknown and arbitrary reasons.
The nal solution suggestion, and the one that should provide immediate ben-
et, is an educational campaign to notify people of the risks of food poisoning.
A simple campaign to let people know that washing their knives, cutting boards
and hands after handling food could reduce possible risks without riling up in-
dustry.62 While this knowledge might be common place, a reinforcement of its
usefulness would help, plus an announcement that additional risk now existed
because of animal drugs might serve to motivate more people to take the correct
precautions with their food.
A nal topic should be addressed on animal drugs. Many have suggested that
the only safe route to take is to completely ban antibiotics from use in animals,
62See Thompson, supra note 56, at 1.
22in particular the use of antibiotics in animals feed. At the very least, people
think that a few antibiotics should be banned, such as penicillin and uoro-
quinolones, because of their widespread human use.63 However, this seems like
an overreaction to the problem. For one, there is a concrete benet to using an-
tibiotics in overall growth of animals and increased food production. Compare
this to the highly debated risk of widespread human antibiotic resistance be-
cause of these animal drugs.64 The FDA, a known conservative agency, would
certainly consider such a ban if there was truly a substantiated link between
animal drugs and the possibility of large-scale human illness. Until that link
is agreed upon by scientists, forcing farmers to quit using animal drugs would
severely restrict farmer's incomes, increase food prices, and cause chaos in the
agricultural and food markets.65 Besides, the cost of enforcing the ban on any
or all antibiotics would be astronomically high in terms of money and man-
power. In other words, a ban would be a pragmatic impossibility because of the
available FDA resources.
The FDA's current proposal, by subjecting certain antibiotics considered neces-
sary for human use to more stringent scrutiny, enables the use of helpful antibi-
otics while still ensuring that problems with particular antibiotics are caught
early and dealt with swiftly. The suggestions in this paper would additionally
further the goal of watching the public safety while not overreacting and cre-
63Patricia B. Lieberman, Control Antibiotic Use, The New York Times, Nov 7, 1999, at
Sec. 4, 14.
64See Human Health Risks with the Subtherapeutic Use of Penicillin or Tetracycline in
Animal Feed, Institute of Medicine Review (1989), at 7.
65See Antibiotic and Sulfonamide Drugs in the Feed of Animals, 38 Fed. Register 9811
(Apr. 20, 1973).
23ating panic and turmoil. The high stakes mandate a careful approach, but the
uncertainty also requires a practical one.
In conclusion, antibiotic resistance is such a threat because of the possibility
of it harming the human population without much notice, perhaps leaving sci-
entists unable to determine the cause of human illness or increased antibiotic
resistance. The measures mentioned in this paper all serve to help provide the
FDA with the ability to closely monitor animal drugs because of their threat,
yet these measures do not compromise farmer's livings or the current agricul-
tural market by overreacting to an unknown and unveried threat. This seems
to be in direct alignment with the FDA's purpose of formulating policies that
best protect and enrich the lives of American citizens.
24Part III. Recommendations for Dealing with the General Problem
of Antibiotic Resistance
Antibiotic resistance is a problem that has plagued the FDA for many years,
perhaps because of its inevitability. Antibiotics are invaluable to medical sci-
ence, but the use of antibiotics necessarily creates strains of resistant bacteria.
While genetically engineered foods and the use of animal drugs creates poten-
tially pandemic problems of antibiotic resistance, the major problem currently
is simply overuse and overprescription of antibiotics.66 Doctors improperly pre-
scribe antibiotics as a panacea drug on a routine basis. For example, antibiotics
are often prescribed for upper respiratory infections (i.e. the common cold) and
middle ear infections, yet these are viral infections that antibiotics are useless
against.67 It is this direct problem of misuse that the FDA can attack far more
easily and perhaps eectively.
The rst suggestion to deal with the overuse of antibiotics by people is to insti-
tute a distribution limit. This could be done by requiring physicians run a check
for bacterial infection before pharmacies are allowed to distribute antibiotics.
This requirement could easily be fullled electronically with communication be-
tween the pharmacy and the manufacturer of the antibiotics, and would ensure
that doctors were prescribing antibiotics for bacterial infections, and not the
common cold.68 Such a system would serve to educate some doctors, while
simply reminding other doctors of the proper use of antibiotics. This simple
66See generally Sandra Levy, Nader Urges Stricter Oversight of DTC Advertising of RX
Drugs, Drug Topics, Mar. 15, 1999, at 16.
67See Markow, supra note 4, at 531.
68See Margaret Gilhooley, When Drugs are Safe for Some But Not Others: The FDA
Experience and Alternatives for Products Liability, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 927, 946-47 (1999).
25distribution limitation would cut to the heart of the antibiotic resistance prob-
lem, without having to create a complex regulatory scheme or adding addition
layers to new antibiotic approval. Considering the inevitability of antibiotic
resistance, still allowing antibiotics to be approved in the same manner as the
status quo is important. New antibiotics will be a simple solution to antibiotic
resistance, and this distributional limit will only indirectly and minimally eect
incentives to invest in new antibiotic development. The market will still remain
huge for antibiotics so the prot potential is not destroyed, and any loss of in-
centives to create new antibiotics is more than outweighed by the good health
and preventative measures having a distributional limit would impose. At the
very least, physical examination should be required before antibiotics can be
prescribed by a physician.69 Of course, narrow exceptions can be tailored when
physical examination is impossible. Having the American Medical Association's
involvement could be critical, not only for public relations but for the ability
of the AMA to provide teeth to this proposal by threatening penalties against
doctors that fail to properly prescribe antibiotics.
The second suggestion for curbing the overuse of antibiotics is the classication
and restriction of certain antibiotics, specically within hospital pharmacies.
Those antibiotics classied as restricted could only be approved for use after
consultation with the infectious disease department of the hospital.70 Restricted
antibiotics will be those the medical community views as essential to protect,
specically those antibiotics that have been successful without a demonstration
69See Misocky, supra note 5, at 756.
70See Markow, supra note 4, at 531.
26of resistance within the human population. This additional distributional lim-
itation could function in conjunction with the rst suggestion, ensuring that
doctors consider the importance of their prescription and then additionally are
restricted in the type of antibiotics they can prescribe. Antibiotic misuse will
be curbed, and specically the misuse of essential antibiotics will be minimized.
One would hope that a program like this could be done voluntarily by hospitals
with any needed assistance provided by the FDA. A voluntary program would
preserve the resources of the FDA, and can also be just as eective as a govern-
mental program, evidenced by the current voluntary program at Mount Sinai
Hospital.71 Indeed, the program at Mount Sinai goes even further than this
proposal by also requiring constant education of physicians on antibiotics and
conducting surveillance, analysis, and monthly reports on the use of antibiotics
within the hospital.72
Finally, the last suggestion would be required additional labeling warnings on
certain antibiotics by the FDA. A warning label on certain antibiotics concern-
ing appropriate use and dosage would serve as an additional layer of protection
against improper prescription by physicians and to provide the patient with an
understanding of the risks of taking antibiotics.73 Considering the current prob-
lem of overprescription and improper prescribing by physicians, such labeling
seems essential to provide consumers with enough information so that they can
know whether they wish to follow their doctor's advice. Labeling might also
71See id.
72See id.; For a discussion of another voluntary distributional limiting program that worked
involving thalidomide see also Gilhooley, supra note 68, at 943-44.
73See id., at 948.
27serve as a deterrent eect for manufactures and physicians by exposing them to
more tort liability if there are misuses of antibiotics. Knowing this, physicians
and manufacturers will be sure that antibiotics are used in a more responsible
way.
The threat feared posed by genetically engineered foods and animal drug use is
apocalyptic but unknown, but the immediate and denite threat of antibiotic
misuse can be countered with the above suggestions. The key is alerting physi-
cians to the problem, and forcing them to be aware and responsible for their
role in the problem. With cooperative eorts between doctors and the FDA,
education about the problem of antibiotic resistance will reach physicians and
patients alike, and that will go a considerable way towards solving the problem.
28Conclusion
Antibiotic resistance is one the more perplexing problems the FDA has encoun-
tered. However, the FDA is in a unique position to play a positive role.
For one, the FDA has expertise and statutory authority over drugs. The
FDA is the agency that people will expect to deal with a problem involving
antibiotics precisely because of their expertise and authority. Second, the FDA
is unique among agencies because it has public respect and condence. The
FDA, more than any other agency, can bring physicians, manufacturers, and
scientists to the negotiating table to reach solutions to this complex problem.
This ability to bring groups together will be critical in the area of antibiotic
resistance where there is such controversy.
Antibiotic resistance poses a threat to mankind. Whether the threat is in-
direct and debated, such as the harm feared because of genetically engineered
food or animal drugs, or more direct and veriable, such as the misuse of an-
tibiotics by people, the FDA can play a central role in curbing the threat. The
key is to act swiftly, before the potential harm is realized.
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